On July 30, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln announced his policy of “retaliation.” This word had a very specific meaning when wielded by politicians, editors, and generals, on both sides. In its most basic terms, it meant a war without mercy, and each side would accuse the other of war crimes. In the summer of 1863, especially, it often was uttered in the context of the United States’ use of black soldiers, and quite predictably, had wildly differing interpretations north and south of the Mason-Dixon.

From the Confederate point of view, the North was trying to initiate and encourage a vast slave uprising throughout the South, which threatened soldiers’ homes while they were away on the battlefield. Rhetoric was so intense in the Confederate capital that lawmakers competed in their efforts to denounce emancipation. At times they mocked the notion that black men could become soldiers, deriding them for cowardice, laziness, and poor intellectual ability. Shortly, the argument would turn apprehensive, evoking fear and horror, crediting the very same black men they denounced as cowards,  with extraordinary violence, and ultimately – power – by declaring that a nationwide slave insurrection – with murder, rape, and arson – was imminent. This was the reason Confederate politicians saw the emancipation proclamation as a villianous instrument, promoting insubordination and violence from their slaves, who, so the story went, were docile and obedient when not riled up by “outside agitators” (like Yankee soldiers). Such horrors had to be prevented, and averted at any cost. It was only proper, therefore, that any “negroes in arms” should be shown no mercy. Slave insurrection, even if it came in the form of organized regiments of disciplined black men wearing Union blue, had to be stopped. The Confederate government felt compelled to take action against such a heinous crime. Any black soldiers would be returned to slavery, if captured, and their white officers would be put to death, as leaders of the insurrection.

From the Union point of view, all Federal soldiers – even those with black skin – had the right to be treated the same as any other U.S. soldier. This was particularly true when a Union soldier was captured. The Confederate government’s refusal to recognize blacks as soldiers, and therefore as customary prisoners, was an egregious violation of the rules of war, said the North. They were duly enlisted as soldiers under the laws of the United States, and therefore should not be singled out for brutal or unorthodox treatment.

Lincoln announced his policy of “retaliation” on July 30, 1863. For every captured Union soldier put at hard labor (or enslaved), a Confederate prisoner would receive the same treatment. For every Union soldier executed, a Confederate prisoner would likewise be put to death. Lincoln hoped the unmerciful provisions of this edict would deter Southerners from following through on their threats. In part, his strategy may have worked. It did not completely eliminate Confederate actions in this regard, but it did seem to make the South slower to implement its policy.

Both sides cried “retaliation” when confronted with the other’s actions in regard to black soldiers. But the war still had two more years to go, and in late July, it was still unclear what had happened to those men, black and white, who had been captured by Confederate forces at Milliken’s Bend, almost two months ago.